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CORRESPONDENCE 
Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct 
Could Be Mis-Regulationt 
Anthony D'Amato* 
Judge Harry T. Edwards has written a lucid and seemingly logical 
plea for the judiciary to be granted exclusive self-regulation over all 
matters of judicial misconduct that fall short of crimes or impeachable 
offenses. 1 His essay demonstrates the seriousness with which he re-
gards misconduct that would bring shame to the federal judiciary. He 
believes that the judiciary as a whole is the best institution to ascertain 
and take measures against individual aberrant judges who are guilty of 
various forms of misconduct, and I have no doubt of the sincerity of 
his belief. Yet when we look at claims for self-regulation in other pro-
fessions - in medicine and in the police force, for example - we find 
historically that progress only takes place when outside lay persons are 
included on or even dominate ethics and misconduct boards. Other-
wise the general operating rule is "cover it up." No matter what the 
profession, any charge that a fellow professional is guilty of malprac-
tice is a prima facie invitation to other professionals to retreat to a 
guild mentality, denying that the infraction took place. The impetus 
to cover up is not primarily due to friendship toward the accused but 
rather to a general perception that disclosure would lead to public dis-
respect of the profession as a whole. The guild mentality is self-protec-
tive at the group level, and results in trumping honest disclosure in all 
but the most egregious cases that would leak to the public anyway. 
With respect to guild mentality, I know of no compelling distinction 
for judges from doctors or police officers. Given the low salaries soci-
ety gives to judges, public esteem is correspondingly an extremely im-
portant job benefit. 2 We perhaps demand too much of human nature 
t ©Copyright 1990 Anthony D'Amato. 
* Judd and Mary Morris Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1958, 
Cornell; J.D. 1961, Harvard; Ph.D. (political science) 1968,, Columbia. - Ed. 
1. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal 
Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765 (1989). 
2. Indeed, the low salary a judge receives magnifies the importance to the judge of the softer 
values of public esteem and trust. Judges can be expected to want to preserve these values. In 
this respect, judges are closer to police officers (who also have low salaries and among whom 
coverups are routine) than they are to doctors (who have made considerable advances in ethical 
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if we expect judges to be unconcerned with the loss of public prestige 
that results from admitting that cases of serious judicial misconduct 
are not extraordinarily rare. 
But placing these general misgivings to one side, my particular 
quarrel with Judge Edwards' essay has three aspects: first, that his 
perception of the problem may be distorted due to the legal culture in 
which he is perhaps unselfconsciously immersed; second, that he 
places an untenably narrow positivistic interpretation on the "good 
behavior" language of the Constitution; and third, that his failure even 
to mention what may be one of the most significant areas of judicial 
misconduct, namely, lack of candor in judicial opinions, proves a cer-
tain institutional blindness to misconduct that undercuts his entire 
plea. I conclude this essay by suggesting that lack of candor is just an 
example, although perhaps the most important one, of the danger of 
entrusting solely to the judiciary the policing of its own members. 
I. THE JUDICIAL SELF-REGULATORY CULTURE 
Judge Edwards' article reveals a microcultural bias that affects his 
entire approach to his subject. In the course of criticizing the Judicial 
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,3 he 
says that its difficulties "reflect the legislature's naivete about judicial 
problems."4 The theory of the Act, he writes, is that by "institut[ing] 
formal procedures intended to promote and expedite legitimate com-
plaints against errant judges," people will be encouraged to make com-
plaints by assurance "that their petitions will be considered 
seriously."5 Then he adds: "However, in reality, the formality only 
encourages disappointed litigants to make unfocused, nonlegally 
grounded charges. . . . [R]eports show that most complaints come 
from litigants who have lost cases before the accused judge."6 I con-
tend that this passage betrays a distinct bias against all complaints of 
judicial misbehavior. It is clear to any impartial observer that litigants 
who win a case will not file complaints against the judge who awarded 
them the favorable decision. No matter how serious a judge's miscon-
duct, the odds are overwhelming that winning litigants will "leave well 
enough alone." To do anything else might jeopardize the favorable 
training and evaluations at the clinical level, in addition to being subject to review by hospital 
ethics boards which were more or less forced upon doctors by the public). 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
4. Edwards, supra note 1, at 789. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
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result in the case. Therefore, practically the only complaints will 
come from "disappointed litigants." 
Because Judge Edwards must surely appreciate the fact that only 
disappointed litigants tend to file misbehavior complaints, his observa-
tions reveal an underlying guild mentality: "How dare these people 
criticize our individual performance as judges? They are nothing but 
disgruntled malcontents. They have no idea how hard we work for 
the public good, and that in every case one party has to lose." Judge 
Edwards dismisses all complainants summarily by this sour grapes 
view of them. 7 His bias operates to prejudice any future complaint, no 
matter how meritorious. His position reveals his own prejudice 
against complaints in general - a prejudice that hardly supports his 
position that judges are the best neutral adjudicators of the misbehav-
ior of their colleagues. 
Evidence that the "sour grapes" attitude is part of the judicial 
microculture and not peculiar to Judge Edwards can be found in the 
way the federal judiciary has implemented the 1980 Act. The clear 
purpose of the Act was to alert the judiciary to situations of judicial 
misconduct or disability in the interests of the effective and expeditious 
administration of justice. 8 The Act permits "[a]ny person" to be a 
complainant;9 the complainant is obviously a facilitator of the statu-
tory purpose and not a party in interest.10 Since there may be some 
persons who want to report instances of judicial misconduct but may 
be afraid to reveal their identities - such as lawyers, clerks, court 
employees, and (in a smaller community) prominent civic leaders or 
businesspersons - encouraging these people to file complaints would 
be consistent with, if not required by, the purpose of the Act. 11 Yet in 
one case, two lawyers were publicly reprimanded and fined $500 each 
for filing disciplinary charges against a judge.12 The "model rules" 
prepared by a special committee of a conference of the chief judges of 
7. In 1986, there were 277 complaints under the Act. The chief judges· acting alone dis-
missed 229 of them, and the remaining 48, 39 were dismissed by the judicial councils. In only 8 
cases was corrective action taken. The one remaining case was withdrawn. Rieger, The Judicial 
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act: Will Judges Judge Judges?, 31 EMORY 
L.J. 45, 59 (1988). 
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(l) (1988). 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(l) (1988). 
10. For example, there is no provision for changing the result in a complainant's lawsuit, nor 
for awarding the complainant damages, if the complainant's charge of judicial misconduct is 
found to be meritorious. 
11. The Act does provide for notice to the complainant of decisions taken, an opportunity to 
appear at certain proceedings, and an opportunity to petition for review if dissatisfied with the 
disposition of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988). Surely these privileges are available to a 
complainant who might choose anonymity. 
12. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 2 Ct. Cl. 255, 262 (1983). 
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the various courts of appeals to implement the Act would appear to 
deter anyone, lawyers included, from filing complaints. The model 
rules specifically require that the complainant sign the complaint and 
verify it under oath or declaration. 13 The special committee explained 
that "this requirement is probably not of the greatest importance," but 
said that it "may deter occasional abuse of the complaint process."14 
Was the special committee candid in its explanation? Surely the price 
for deterring "occasional abuse" could tend to be destructive of the 
purpose of the Act. Requiring a signature and verification could deter 
all complainants who might selflessly want to improve the justice sys-
tem but who are afraid ofrevealing their identity for fear ofreprisals. 15 
Nevertheless, all the circuits that have issued rules and forms imple-
menting the 1980 Act have adopted the requirement of identification 
of the complainant.16 
Although at the present writing all circuits apparently have issued 
forms substantially similar to the model forms suggested by the Chief 
Judges, the Third Circuit experimented with its own rules and forms 
for the period 1984-1987. The direction it took did not improve the 
task of complainants. Indeed, the Third Circuit's version was substan-
tially more restrictive and intimidating than the Chief Judges' 
model.17 
13. ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DIS• 
ABILITY 8 (Rule 2(f)) (Federal Judicial Center 1986). 
14. Id. at 10. 
15. Information from anonymous sources still may be considered by the chief judges in their 
role as chairpersons of the circuit judicial councils; the 1980 Act does not revoke that practice. 
See id. at 11. But the Act itself cannot be triggered by an anonymous complainant when the 
implementing rules require signature and verification. 
16. See U.S. Ct. of App. 2d Cir. Appendix (Rules of the Judicial Council of the Second 
Circuit Governing Complaints Against Judicial Officer Under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) Rule 2(f)), 28 
U.S.C.A. (1990); U.S. Ct. of App. 3d Cir. Appendix V, Rule 2{f), 28 U.S.C.A. (1990); U.S. Ct. of 
App. 4th Cir. Appendix I, Rule 2(f) 28 U.S.C.A. (1990); U.S. Ct. of App. 8th Cir. Appendix IV, 
Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A. (1990); U.S. Ct. of App. 11th Cir. Addendum III, Rule 2{f), 28 U.S.C.A. 
(1990); Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Governing Com· 
plaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability 3 (Rule 2{f)) (1987). 
17. The 1984-1987 Complaint Form for the Third Circuit states on the first page that "All 
questions must be answered concisely in the proper space on the form. Where more room is 
needed to answer any question, use the reverse side of the page. Additional pages are not permit· 
ted." United States Court of Appeals {Third Circuit) Judicial Council, Rules of the Judicial 
Council of the Third Circuit With Respect to Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability 
43-46 (Appendix) (Nov. 14, 1984). The Complaint Form in its entirety will frustrate any filer 
who attempts to follow these initial instructions. Questions 3, 4, and 5 each have different rules 
regarding the available room to answer. Question 3 states: "If the space provided is insufficient, 
use the bottom of Page 46." Question 4 requires the complainant to answer the question "in the 
space provided below." Question 5 specifically directs the complainant to answer the question in 
the space provided and then to use "the reverse side of the page." The most frustrating question 
is Question 3. It reads: 
Tell your story briefly, including the grounds upon which your complaint is based and the 
facts supporting them. Describe how the judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject 
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The insistence that a complainant disclose his identity and assume 
the risk of an indictment for perjury seems sharply at variance with 
Judge Edwards' own characterization of the intent of Congress in 
passing the 1980 Act - "to promote and expedite legitimate com-
plaints against errant judges."18 But if Judge Edwards wants to use 
the Form as a guillotine to separate legitimate from illegitimate com-
plaints, 19 Judge Aldisert, who wrote an introduction to the experimen-
tal Rules of the Third Circuit that were in effect from 1984 to 1987, 
wanted the form to do the work of weeding out improper attempts to 
seek review of the substantive merits of the case. He claimed that the 
Rules "provide an efficient and fair procedure to delineate the impor-
tant distinction between a genuine complaint of judicial misconduct 
and an improper attempt to seek review of the substantive merits of a 
case or controversy."20 The distinction may be "important" to Judge 
Aldisert, but I doubt that it will ever be clear. Indeed it becomes in-
creasingly fuzzy as the gravity of the judicial misconduct increases. A 
complainant will very likely believe that the presiding judge, who in 
of the complaint is involved. Include also the names of other persons involved, dates and 
places. Do not give any legal arguments or cite any cases or statutes. If the space provided 
is insufficient, use the bottom of Page 46. 
The "space provided" consists of thirteen ruled lines. The extra space on Page 46 is a blank 
space containing an additional twelve lines (assuming the same spacing as the previous ruled 
lines). Because Rule (2) of the Instructions provides that no pages may be added to the Com-
plaint, and because the general rule that one may write on the back of a page is contradicted by 
the more specific rules accompanying Questions 3, 4, and 5, it is clear - well, clear except to the 
most intrepid or foolhardy - that the complainant has twenty-five lines, and no more, to "tell 
your story briefly." · 
Suppose a disappointed litigant, who believes that the judge misbehavecI and may even have a 
mental disability, tries to tell her story briefly in 25 lines. She soon discovers, after listing "the 
names of other persons involved, dates, and places," which Question 3 requires her to do, that 
she has very little space remaining to tell what happened. If her story is at all complex, and the 
grounds of her suspicion are at all impressionistic (rarely will judicial misbehavior be so gross as 
to be obvious on the face of the record), she will hardly have adequate space. If she believes that 
the judge either has a mental abnormality or has behaved irrationally or drunkenly, it will be 
extremely difficult for her to describe the judge's conduct in a few lines while confining herself 
solely to the reporting of objective facts. Even psychologists find it difficult to describe aberrant 
behavior in wholly objective, factual terms, and their case studies are not notorious for brevity. 
Unless the complainant can write with the precision and economy of Jane Austen, she runs the 
risk of being prosecuted for perjury. And she has further reason to fear the possibility that the 
persons who will sit in judgment at her perjury trial will be the same judges, or their colleagues, 
who misconstrued her complaint in the first place. 
18. Edwards, supra note l, at 789. 
19. To be sure, one might construe the word "legitimate" so as to justify the complaint form: 
the form is set out the way it is to weed out illegitimate complaints. But the word "legitimate" 
always begs the question - especially so in the present context where the ultimate deciders of 
what is or is not "legitimate" are the colleagues of the person accused of misconduct. In any 
event, there are other equally possible constructions of the word "legitimate" in the statute - for 
example, that Congress really wants to give legitimate complaints a chance of succeeding, and 
not that it wants to ensure at all costs that illegitimate complaints be discouraged. 
20. Third Circuit Rules, supra note 17, at iii (Introduction by Chief Judge Ruggero J. 
Aldisert). 
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her view misbehaved, rendered a clearly unjust verdict.21 She may 
indeed believe that the misbehavior caused the unjust verdict, and that 
the unjust verdict constitutes at least some evidence of the misbehav-
ior. She will thus find it almost impossible to separate her complaint 
about the misconduct from her view that the decision itself was unjust 
on the merits. She may well believe that as soon as the other judges 
read her complaint, they will spot the clear injustice in the ruling al-
most as if it were an uncontrovertible fact. In this regard, she is a 
typical member of the public, secure in the belief that the adjudicatory 
system normally produces just results.22 She is almost certain to be 
bitterly disappointed. She may lack the mindset of lawyers and judges 
who have learned through experience that the system produces many 
unjust results, that in practice law and justice can be entirely different 
things. 
The Edwards-Aldisert-Third Circuit approach reflects this insider 
view. Their approach appears to assume that the public shares the 
profession's cynical views about justice. Nothing else explains Judge 
Aldisert's notion that the very form the Third Circuit has imple-
mented will unerringly guide a complainant to bifurcate her convic-
tions regarding a judge's misbehavior and the obvious unjustness of 
that judge's ruling. 
Both Judge Edwards' attempt to use the rules to weed out illegiti-
mate complaints and Judge Aldisert's attempt to separate misbehavior 
from unjust results - and the additional fact that neither of them for 
a moment questions the propriety or overdeterrence of criminal prose-
cution for perjury if a complainant steps over their lines - illustrate 
not so much the jurisprudential futility of attempting to have any form 
do this kind of heavy work, but rather the judges' own cultural presup-
positions. If they have made the path to complaining about judicial 
misbehavior rocky, narrow, incoherent, and fraught with peril, they 
presumably have done so not out of absent mindedness but rather be-
cause they want to discourage complaints. 
The judges' efforts appear to have worked. Professor Carol T. Rie-
ger has reported on the implementation of the 1980 Act.23 From Oc-
21. Of course, a complainant might feel that the verdict was "against the law." Clearly, 
disappointed litigants should not be able to use the Act as a quasi·appellate procedure. The Act 
itself states that a complaint should be dismissed if found to be "directly related to the merits of a 
decision or procedural ruling." 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii) (1988). But a decision against the 
law is not necessarily a decision against justice. Accordingly, in the text I have talked only about 
decisions that appear to be contrary to justice. 
22. For an example of a law professor's outrage at a decision that seemed to him clearly at 
variance with law and justice, see Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easter-
brook on Good Faith, - IOWA L. REv. - (forthcoming). 
23. Rieger, supra note 7. 
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tober 1981, the effective date of the Act, through June 1986, only 309 
complaints were filed under the Act - an average of 65 complaints 
per year. 24 "Corrective action" was taken only in 8 cases - less than 
3% of the complaints filed. Professor Rieger comments on the nature 
of this "corrective action": 
Not all circuits make their decisions public, so it is not possible to tell 
what all of these "corrective actions" might be. In the dispositions 
which are public, some simply make the cryptic comment that "appro-
priate corrective action has been taken," without revealing the nature of 
the conduct or the remedial action. Most of the other public dispositions 
under the "Corrective Action Taken" label indicate that the Chief Judge 
has talked with the judge or magistrate against whom a complaint was 
filed, and he or she expressed regret about how the particular action or 
words complained of were interpreted by the complaining party, and an 
intention not to do it again. 25 
In sum, the very procedures set up by the judiciary betray a dis-
tinctly unfavorable disposition toward complaints about misbehavior 
of their fellows. These procedures provide no reassurance that judges 
can or should self-regulate cases of judicial misconduct. But if his nor-
mative appeal fails, Judge Edwards has a constitutional string to his 
bow. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Judge Edwards turns to the Constitution to argue that, like it or 
not, only judges can judge the misbehavior of judges. He contends 
that the Constitution mandates that the judiciary retain the exclusive 
power of self-regulation for all acts of judicial misconduct that fall 
short of crimes or impeachable offenses. 
A. The Reductionist Move 
Judge Edwards devotes most of his essay to an analysis of the good 
behavior clause of article III, which states that judges "shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour." I would imagine that a normal read-
ing of this clause suggests that a badly behaving judge must not be 
allowed to stay in office. Not so, says Judge Edwards. He finds in the 
impeachment clauses in articles I and II the sole means and standard 
for removing judges from office; hence, any judge who is not success-
fully impeached may remain in office despite the apparent meaning of 
24. Id. at 46. Compare the statistic that between 1984 and 1987, following the decision in 
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (attorneys' fees may be awarded when a plaintiff wins a 
suit against a judge for injunctive or declaratory relief), approximately 1500 cases were filed 
against state judicial officers. McMillion, Restoring Judicial Immunity, 16 A.B.A. J. 107 (1990). 
25. Rieger, supra note 7, at 58-59 (footnotes omitted). 
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the good behavior clause. The standard for impeachment is "high 
crimes and misdemeanors," and the means is Congress. However, 
Judge Edwards would not drain the good behavior clause of all mean-
ing. He believes that it stands for a basic principle, one that he finds 
meritorious - the principle of judicial independence. This appears to 
be a rather magical principle in Judge Edwards' hands, because once it 
is produced, the actual words of the clause disappear. 
Judge Edwards bolsters his vanishingly narrow interpretation of 
the good behavior clause by reference to both the principle of judicial 
independence and the doctrine of separation of powers. Because he 
finds the notion of judicial independence to be derived from the good 
behavior clause itself - the very clause he is trying to construe - it 
hardly constitutes independent support for his position. Judge Ed-
wards' argument is severely reductionist: clause X boils down to prin-
ciple Y, then principle Y rises up to lop off anything in clause X 
inconsistent with principle Y. In his hands, the good behavior clause 
in effect reads: ''judges shall hold their offices during good or bad 
behavior." 
To bolster a weak position, Judge Edwards shifts his ground to the 
doctrine of separation of powers. He finds that the "principle of judi-
cial independence is actually an outgrowth of the separation of powers 
doctrine."26 To be sure, Judge Edwards admits that "[t]he Constitu-
tion says nothing about separation of powers per se; it speaks only of 
the assignment of powers."27 He further concedes that each branch 
has the power to check the actions of the others.28 But "checking" is 
apparently one thing and "meddling" another, according to Judge Ed-
wards. "Checking" is consistent with the doctrine of separation of 
powers but "meddling" is not. Although the Constitution says noth-
ing about meddling, apparently "separation of powers" for Judge Ed-
wards is precisely equivalent to "thou shalt not meddle." 
If history has taught us anything about checking and meddling, it 
is that when Branch A of government tries to supervise the activities of 
Branch B, Branch A always characterizes its own actions as checking, 
whereas Branch B invariably characterizes the very same actions as 
meddling. Surely the words "checking" and "meddling" are merely 
clashing forms of rhetoric. Yet Judge Edwards gives us an example -
one that illuminates his general outlook. Lower federal courts, he 
26. Edwards, supra note 1, at 767. His use of the word "actually" in this sentence suggests 
an abandonment of his previous reliance on the good behavior clause as establishing judicial 
independence. 
27. Id. at 781. 
28. Id. at 782. 
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states, have prudentially refrained from deciding cases involving inter-
nal congressional affairs even though jurisdiction for judicial action 
might otherwise be found. 29 "We are reluctant to meddle in the inter-
nal affairs of the legislative branch," said one such court.30 Judge Ed-
wards quotes his own concurrence in a recent case: "Reciprocal 
respect for the courts suggests that Congress should, and arguably 
must, be equally reluctant to impose its preferences on the judiciary's 
governance of its internal affairs."31 Putting aside the question of 
what is "internal" - even though such a question points up the tau-
tology of the entire construction - the message Judge Edwards and 
his colleagues are actually sending to Congress is: we didn't meddle 
with you, so don't meddle with us. 
But as we examine this example, we see that its reasoning hides 
under a reciprocity mask the possibility that it was judicial fear of 
congressional interference with the judiciary that gave rise to this 
"prudential" judicial doctrine of nonmeddling in the first place. If so, 
the entire argument is self-consuming. We can hardly credit judicial 
passivity in these cases to some "legal" doctrine; it is rather a per-
ceived (and perhaps from the viewpoint of the players a rational) self-
protection mechanism. The courts may have decided not to "meddle" 
(as Congress might perceive it) in internal congressional affairs for the 
very reason that such self-restraint might ward off congressional 
"meddling" (as the judiciary might perceive it) in judicial affairs. This 
kind of don't-scratch-my-back-and-I-won't-scratch-yours surely has 
nothing to do with justice, the Constitution, or checks and balances 
(except for the most devout followers of Alexander Bickel), but it has 
everything to do with judges watching out for themselves. Surely 
then, what amounts to another example of guild mentality should not 
count as a constitutional reason to eviscerate the good behavior clause. 
B. The Positivist Move 
As we have seen, because Judge Edwards believes that the sole ba-
sis to remove a judge is through the impeachment process, he gives no 
independent meaning to the good behavior clause. There is perhaps 
some support for his argument as a narrow positivistic stance. If posi-
tivism (of the decidedly Austinian variety) says that "law" only has 
29. Id. at 784. 
30. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985). 
31. Edwards, supra note 1, at 785 (quoting Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United 
States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter "Hastings I"] (Edwards, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 904 (1986). 
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"bite" where there is a remedy, and rules without remedies are not 
"law,"32 one might say that only the impeachment clause, in this con-
text, provides a remedy (removal from office). Hence, compared to it, 
the good behavior clause is just a placeholder (or just "positive moral-
ity" in Austin's classic sense). 
Yet we do not have to be originalists to acknowledge that the 
Framers were not Austinian positivists. I think it is quite realistic to 
attribute to them a natural law (or right reason, Blackstonian) per-
spective that a judge should not hold office if the judge engaged in 
behavior so bad that he could no longer properly be called a "judge." 
Even if the Framers had never adverted33 to some of the following 
possibilities, so long as we attribute rationality to their intentions we 
can say with some confidence that they would have regarded at least 
certain kinds of judicial misconduct to be destructive of the title 
''judge." These kinds of judicial misconduct may fall short of "high 
crimes or misdemeanors" - they may not be criminal at all - yet 
nevertheless constitute such nongood behavior as to make the actor a 
nonjudge. Take, for example, a judge who decides cases according to 
(a) the flip of a coin, (b) the comparative wealth of plaintiff and de-
fendant, (c) the comparative size of contributions by counsel to the 
judge's nomination,34 or (d) friendship with certain attorneys who ap-
pear before him. These forms of conduct clearly violate the "good 
behavior" requirement though not the impeachment standard. Thus 
the sole basis for removing such judges appears to be the good behav-
ior clause. Can there be any doubt that such judges, if they engage in 
one or more of those kinds of behavior, should not remain in office? 
Indeed, once one visualizes and takes seriously these particular forms 
of judicial misconduct that fall short of high crimes or misdemeanors, 
one marvels once again at the intellectual comprehensiveness of the 
32. The exact opposite, by the way, of Justice Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1Cranch)137 (1803) (Marbury had a "right," therefore he had a right to a "remedy,'' but 
not from this Court). 
33. It is not at all unusual to attribute to someone a particular purpose that never crossed 
that person's mind. This is the point of Wittgenstein's famous observation, "Someone says to 
me: 'Shew the children a game.' I teach them gaming with dice, and the other says 'I didn't 
mean that sort of game.' Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind 
when he gave me the order?" L. WITIGENSfEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS§ 70 (at-
tached slip) (1953). Probate judges often make this move in deciding what the testator would 
have intended had he or she known certain facts (which occurred after the testator's death). 
34. Even though federal judges do not run for office, counsel may support a judge through 
public advocacy and behind-the-scenes support for the judge during the nomination process. 
(Many practicing attorneys are afraid to speak out against nominees to the federal bench because 
of possible reprisals against them if the nominee they oppose is appointed.) In the context of 
many state courts, the potential for abuse is more obvious: a judge may decide in favor of coun-
sel who contributed more to the judge's campaign for office. See Sixty Minutes: Justice for Sale? 
(television program on the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation, of Dec. 6, 1987). 
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Framers in actually providing language - the good behavior clause -
that should give Congress a check-and-balance power to remove false 
or dishonest judges. 3s 
Ill. A TEST CASE: CANDOR IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
There is one form of judicial misconduct that I think clinches the 
case against Judge Edwards' position: lack of candor in judicial opin-
ions. One of the worst things a judge can do is to ignore or misstate 
the critical facts or critical legal issues in a case. Since this kind of 
misconduct is not generally considered a "crime" nor an impeachable 
offense,36 it would fall squarely within the realm of judicial misbehav-
ior that Judge Edwards leaves to the judiciary to regulate. 
Surprisingly, Judge Edwards does not even mention lack of candor 
as a form of judicial misbehavior in an essay that lists many other 
forms of judicial misconduct. His omission is, I think, part of the (per-
haps unselfconscious) guild mentality that I mentioned earlier, for I 
have not come across any essay or book by any judge that considers 
seriously the problem of lack of candor in opinion-writing. I suggest 
that this thundering silence is not due to a general lack of awareness of 
the problem, but rather reflects a deeply imbedded fear that such a 
matter is the dirtiest of linen that should not be displayed in public. 
Consider a recent, gutsy speech given to the Federal Circuit Judicial 
35. Given the "high tone" style of the Constitution, the Committee on Style might well have 
decided not to put the matter negatively ("judges who misbehave shall be removed from office") 
but rather positively Gudges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour"). 
Judge Edwards argues that a misbehaving judge does not necessarily have to be removed 
from office. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 794-95. There are other sanctions, such as progres-
sively lightening the misbehaving judge's case docket, so as to cut down the opportunities for 
mischief. But this kind of "punishment" can backfire; a "lazy" judge who simply wants to draw 
full salary for doing as little work as possible might be positively encouraged to misbehave so that 
his workload will be deliberately reduced. So long as his misbehavior falls short of an impeacha-
ble offense, he may succeed in maximizing his hourly income. His example may have a deleteri-
ous effect on honest and overworked judges. Thus, by reading out of the good behavior clause 
the ultimate penalty of removal from office, Judge Edwards may have succeeded only in setting 
up an intolerable situation where misbehavior is actually rewarded by reducing the miscreant 
judge's workload. Compare the complaint recently filed with the Judicial Review Council of 
Connecticut alleging that Judge Edward F. Stodolink "has voiced his disdain of personally adju-
dicating matrimonial disputes and has frequently threatened attorneys with the likelihood of an 
unsatisfactory result if forced to preside over such disputes." Complaint of Theodore Kamasin-
ski Against Judge Edward F. Stodolink of the Danbury Superior Court (Oct. 23, 1990). 
36. This is the current state of the law - even though the misconduct may result in deliber-
ately incarcerating an innocent person or in another form of substantial injustice. It is a far cry 
from the origins of common law in England. 
In earliest English law not only was immunity of judges not recognized, but review of judi-
cial decisions was in the form of a personal action against the judge. The consequences of a 
false judgment, a malicious judgment, or an action outside the judge's authority were severe 
for the judge and the jurisdiction he represented. 
Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L. REv. 201, 205 (1980). 
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Conference by one of the nation's leading scholars on judicial ethics, 
Professor Monroe Freedman: 
Frankly, I have had more than enough of judicial opinions that bear no 
relationship whatsoever to the cases that have been filed and argued 
before the judges. I am talking about judicial opinions that falsify the 
facts of the cases that have been argued, judicial opinions that make dis-
ingenuous use or omission of material authorities, judicial opinions that 
cover up these things with no-publication and no-citation rules. 37 
Professor Freedman wrote a letter to me in which he stated that at the 
luncheon immediately following his speech, a judge sitting next to him 
said (apropos of the passage above quoted), "you don't know the half 
of it!"38 
The possibility of judges changing the facts of a case came home to 
me in connection with a federal habeas petition I filed in the Seventh 
Circuit. 39 In its detailed recitation of the facts of the case, a three-
judge panel of the Court of Appeals omitted mention of earwitness 
testimony for the prosecution that established the time of the murder 
as occurring when the defendant was proved to be a mile and a half 
away tending patients in a hospital.40 The earwitness' testimony was 
prominent in the jury trial and it was uncontroverted. By omitting a 
primary fact that proved the defendant was not at the scene of the 
crime - and by ignoring other facts which also proved that the de-
fendant could not have committed the crime - the Court of Appeals 
was able to construct possible guilt out of circumstantial evidence.41 
37. M. Freedman, Speech to the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (May 24, 1989), reprinted in 128 F.R.D. 409, 439 
(1989). 
38. Letter from Monroe Freedman to Anthony D'Amato, Oct. 14, 1989 (quoted with the 
permission of Professor Freedman). 
39. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988), rehg. denied, No. 87-3052 (Sept. 2, 
1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1645 (1989). Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals, joined by Judges Manion and Eschbach. 
40. At the trial the neighbor said she heard "sounds," and throughout the rest of the trial the 
prosecutor and defense attorney referred to her testimony as the testimony about the "shots." 
The assistant prosecutor, in closing, referred to it as the "sounds of the gun." Judge Easterbrook 
at one point in his opinion included a mention of the next-door-neighbor's testimony in a paren-
thetical comment on the opinion of district court Judge Getzendanner. He said, "Judge 
Getzendanner had a different theory: Branion left the Hospital before 11:30 and killed his wife (a 
neighbor reported hearing a commotion in the Branion apartment before 11:30), returned to the 
Hospital to establish his presence away from the scene of the crime, and only then picked up his 
son." 855 F.2d at 1261. Because Judge Easterbrook found that Judge Getzendanner's theory of 
the crime was erroneous, because he labeled it a "theory," and because he only used the word 
"commotion," no reader of his opinion could imagine that Judge Easterbrook was referring to 
the exculpatory fact that the murder occurred when the defendant was a mile and a half away 
from the scene of the crime, particularly since it was the prosecution that elicited the evidence 
from its own witness and did not controvert it. 
41. It should be acknowledged here that the posture of the case before the Seventh Circuit 
was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and calls for the evidence to be evaluated in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, rather than a full review as if on direct appeal. However, even 
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I presented a paper at an international conference in honor of Jac-
ques Derrida detailing the evidence in this case and specifying the 
Court's omission of the primary exculpatory fact (as well as several 
other critical omissions and distortions). The paper was entitled "The 
Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts."42 This paper 
was reported at length in the "At the Bar" column of The New York 
Times.43 Many attorneys, judges, and law professors who saw the 
Times column wrote to me. A New York attorney, who was formerly 
an Administrative Law Judge, said in reference to one of his cases, "I 
have been shocked to find that the courts invented testimony to sup-
port their conclusions. "44 A Florida attorney wrote, "I have received 
opinions in which the appellate court has deliberately misstated the 
facts in order to make a difficult and complex question disappear, in 
order to justify a judicial vigilantism, or in order simply to bolster a 
decision which the appellate court would have made in any event."45 
The attorney candidly added, "I have been both the beneficiary and 
the victim of such tactics."46 A Georgia lawyer wrote, "I have had a 
similar experience where the appellate court simply fabricated the 
facts."47 A final example is from a Boston attorney who says that the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts "engaged in almost precisely 
the sort of legerdemain you are reported to have criticized."48 
Every practicing attorney with whom I have discussed the matter 
of lack of judicial candor has told me of at least one case when it 
clearly happened to him or to her, and some say that the practice is 
unfortunately quite common. What good is adversarial argument, one 
this standard would require some discussion as to why the earwitness testimony was not 
dispositive. 
42. The symposium was entitled "Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice," and was 
held at Cardozo Law School, New York City, on October 2, 1989. A slightly edited version of 
the paper was subsequently published. See D'Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court 
Misstates the Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1323 (1990). 
43. Margolick, A Law Professor with a Beef Takes the Judge to Task and the Case to the 
Public, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at BS, cols. 1-2. 
44. Letter from Thomas Redmond Matais, Esq., to Professor Anthony D'Amato, Mar. 20, 
1990. 
45. Letter from Joel S. Perwin, Esq., to Professor Anthony D'Amato, Oct. 17, 1989. Mr. 
Perwin in his letter cites a U.S. Supreme Court reversal of one of his appellate cases "which 
implicitly acknowledged the lower appellate court's factual misstatement by stating the facts in a 
manner directly opposite to the lower court's statement." See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 483 n.27 (1985), revg. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1512-13 
(11th Cir. 1984). 
46. Letter from Joel S. Perwin, Esq., to Professor Anthony D'Amato, supra note 45. 
47. Letter from J. Michael Raffaufto Professor Anthony D'Amato, Oct. 13, 1989. Mr. Raf-
fauf cites the case of Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 864 F.2d 734 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
70 (1989). 
48. Letter from Richard L. Dahlen, Esq., to Professor Anthony D'Amato, Oct. 13, 1989. 
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of them asked, if a judge can play God with the facts of a case? Some 
attorneys have told me that if they had known that the practice of law 
would be like this, they would have chosen a different profession.49 
Surely when a critical fact is proved and undisputed at trial, the whole 
legal world seems to crumble when the losing attorney sees no men-
tion of the fact in the judge's written opinion or sees that the judge 
relied explicitly on a contrary unproved "fact." Hardly anything 
could be more unfair. 
Arguably there is an incentive in the judicial system to misstate the 
facts of a case. Judges hate to be reversed; many grade their own per-
formance by how small a percentage of their cases are reversed on 
appeal. By misstating the facts of a case - if misstatement is neces-
sary to "justify" a desired result - a judge can all but ensure that her 
decision will not be reversed on appeal. Higher courts are uninter-
ested in retrying disputations about facts; they are only interested in 
"law."50 They will be impatient with arguments of counsel that the 
facts were otherwise than as found by the trial judge. They say repeat-
edly that they have no time to plunge into the morass of fact-determi-
nation. Hence, a judge who invents or misstates a critical fact in favor 
of the party to whom she decides to award the decision may well have 
high confidence that her decision will thus be insulated from reversal 
by a higher court.st 
49. They also invariably add that they are themselves in no position to blow the whistle for 
fear of retaliation by the judge they criticize or by the judge's colleagues. 
50. A higher court itself may misstate a written source. Consider the recent decision by the 
Illinois Supreme Court in In re Peel, 126 Ill. 2d 397 (1989), revd., Peel v. Attorney Reg. & 
Disciplinary Commn., 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990). An attorney placed on his letterhead the words 
"Certified Civil Trial Specialist By the National Board of Trial Advocacy." The Illinois Attor-
ney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended that the attorney be censured for 
holding out to the public that he was "certified" as a specialist. In imposing the sanction of 
censure on the attorney, the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion cited the Webster's dictionary 
definition of "certificate" as "a document issued by .•• a state agency ... certifying that one has 
satisfactorily ... attained professional standing in a given field and may officially practice or hold 
a position in that field." 126 Ill. 2d at 405, citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 366 (1986). When the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Court's attention 
was drawn to the elisions in the Illinois Supreme Court's quotation from Webster's. The full 
quotation is: "a document issued by a school, a state agency, or a professional organization certi-
fying that one has satisfactorily completed a course of studies, has passed a qualifying examina-
tion, or has attained professional standing in a given field and may officially practice or hold a 
position in that field." 110 s. Ct. at 2289, citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY, supra, at 367 (emphasis added to portions omitted from 126 Ill. 2d at 405). In 
short, the portion of the definition omitted by the Illinois Supreme Court supports the opposite of 
that court's conclusion; it justifies the attorney's use of "certified" in his letterhead instead of 
impeaching it. 
51. Perhaps the origin of such judicial misbehavior is a failure of law professors to teach fact-
determination in law schools. By concentrating on deductive and pseudo-deductive legal system-
atization, we deliver the message to those of our students who will someday become judges that 
facts of cases are uninteresting and that the real intellectual excitement comes from disputing the 
content of "the law." 
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Do all judges more or less share in occasional misstating or omis-
sion of facts? I believe that the majority of judges are honest persons 
of great integrity who would not consciously do such a thing. Never-
theless, many judges may feel that their own standing in the commu-
nity could be undermined by disclosures that other judges invent or 
misstate facts. The issue here is not which judges have integrity, but 
rather that the judicial culture itself apparently has little room for 
countenancing disclosure of misbehavior that could undermine public 
confidence in the judiciary. 52 I would be far more disposed toward 
accepting Judge Edwards' plea for judicial self-regulation if I were to 
see concrete evidence of judges themselves bringing up the matter of 
candor in opinion-writing and offering practical suggestions as to how 
self-regulation can curb and eventually eliminate judicial invention or 
misstatement of facts. 
52. Compare Plato's view of "justice" in The Laws: institutions of justice exist to stabilize a 
society rather than do justice; what is impermissible is the appearance of injustice rather than 
injustice itself. Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod. Aeschylus and 
Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279, 321-24 (1987). 
